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Logical Limitations: 
Loss of Spousal, Parental and Filial Consortium Claims 
 
Jeffrey A. VanderLaan 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The ability to sue for the loss of society and companionship of a loved one has taken 
many forms since its inception at common law.  By another name, the cause of action for loss of 
consortium has been recognized to include the loss of society and companionship, evolving into 
a right of recovery not simply benefiting the patriarch whose “property,” or wife and children, 
have been tortuously injured or killed, but also to benefit many of the familial relationships 
Americans value.  Perhaps because of its intangible and non-pecuniary character, the nature and 
extent of the loss of consortium claim vary wildly from state to state.  Some states have altered 
the common law rules by statute, others have used judicial interpretations to encourage the use 
of the loss of consortium claim to include not only a spousal relationship, but also the parent-
child relationship.  What is needed is uniform state legislation which clearly enunciates the 
bounds and circumstances under which a consortium claim will be allowed. 
At first blush, it appears that no controversy exists; the judiciary is acting through 
differing lens of judicial interpretation to either create new causes of action or prevent the 
proliferation of them.  However, in Michigan, and other states as well, there is an inherent 
contradiction in the manner in which the judiciary allows family members to sue a tortfeasor for 
the loss of society and companionship, or the consortium, of a loved one.  Specifically, 
Michigan’s wrongful death statute allows the parents of a tortuously killed child to sue for the 
loss of their child’s consortium,1 while the Supreme Court has chosen to deny parents of 
                                                 
1 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922(6) (2001).   
tortuously injured children the same cause of action.2  Many courts, including those in New 
York and Illinois have ruled in a similar manner.3  Others, however, take the opposite view, 
allowing parents recovery for the loss of their tortuously injured child’s society and 
companionship.4  Still other jurisdictions have wisely preempted the oft-confusing decisions of 
the judiciary, employing a statutory cause of action which allow the parents of tortuously injured 
children to recover for the loss of filial consortium as well.5   
The debate begins with an analysis of  the underlying policy rationales of the different 
types of consortium, called patriarchal, spousal and filial for the purposes of clarity in this 
writing.  The evolution of the reasoning by which the consortium claim has been recognized and 
expanded bears insight into who should draw a proper line of demarcation which limits the 
consortium claim to a logical and manageable point.  In the context of the five states whose 
approaches are analyzed here and in light of the underlying policies of the different types of 
consortium claims, this paper will address where the judiciary and legislatures of these states 
have gone too far, not gone far enough or have simply gone mad.    
I.   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: LOSS OF CONSORTIUM6 
 A.   Spousal Consortium 
 Beginning with the paternalistic notions of early law, the patriarch has always asserted 
the right to recover for injuries to his servants, or property, at the hands of third parties.7  By the 
Seventeenth Century, courts began analogizing the master-servant relationship with the spousal 
                                                 
2 See Sizemore v. Smock, 430 Mich. 283, 299 (1988).   
3 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery, Inc., 67 N.E.2d 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946); Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d 209 
(Ill. 1988).   
4 See United States v. Dempsey, 635 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1994); Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 
1052 (Ohio 1993).   
5 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85X (2001). 
6 Policy considerations underlying the various types of consortium claims will be addressed in the foregoing sections 
of this paper, the immediate section serves to generally define the types of consortium.  See infra notes 151-189 and 
accompanying text. 
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relationship, giving husbands the right to recover the loss their wives’ services from tortfeasors.8  
Eventually, husbands were allowed to seek emotional damages as well.9  This included recovery 
for sexual relations, comfort, society and companionship.10  Consequently, the term “consortium 
damages” for husbands came to encompass not only the financial losses, including the lost 
services and medical expenses a patriarch suffered when his wife was injured, but it also 
included damages for injury to his emotions as a result of having an injured spouse.11 
Conversely, the wife had no analogous cause of action.12  If her husband was injured, a 
wife “was without remedy for the loss of household assistance, sexual intercourse, 
companionship and affection.”13   In 1950, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia rebuffed this divided approach to the spousal consortium cause of action and allowed 
a wife to seek recovery for the loss of her husband’s consortium.14  Other jurisdictions soon 
followed and today “[a]ny tort causing direct physical harm to one spouse will give rise to a 
claim for loss of consortium by the other.”15  
B.   Parental and Filial Consortium 
Similar to the English common law treatment of wives, fathers were allowed to recover 
damages for their “servant” children who were injured by a third-party tortfeasor.16  Gradually in 
many jurisdictions, parents were allowed recovery for the loss of a child’s consortium.17  
                                                                                                                                                             
7 See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 125 at 931 (5th ed. 1984). 
8 See id.  
9 See id.  See also Matthew Brady, Back Up and Hit Him Again: Illinois’ Problem With Parental Consortium Lost 
Because of Nonfatal Injury, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 546-49 (1994). 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. 
14 See id. at 932 (citing Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (1950)). 
15 Id.  Procedurally, loss of consortium claims are generally brought together with the injured spouse’s claims 
against the tortfeasor and are tried together in order to prevent duplicative recovery for claimed damages.  See id. at 
933. 
16 See id. at 934. 
17 See id. 
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Beginning in the 1980’s, some jurisdictions began to recognize that a child had a cause of action 
for an injured parent’s consortium.18  However, as this paper will demonstrate, a mystifying split 
exists in contemporary American jurisprudence, which begs interference by state legislatures in 
many cases, over allowing parents and children to recover non-pecuniary consortium-type 
damages for injuries inflicted upon the other by an intentional or negligent tortfeasor.19  These 
damages include those such as the loss of society, companionship, love and comfort of a parent 
or child.  In some cases, recovery is allowed for all financial and non-financial damages by both 
the parent and a child of an injured parent or child, and in other cases no recovery is allowed.20  
In still other jurisdictions, a child is allowed to seek consortium damages for an injured parent, 
while parents are denied the same right of recovery when the child is injured.21 
II.   THE MICHIGAN INTERPRETATION 
In Sizemore v. Smock, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the plaintiff’s claims for 
the “loss of the companionship, society and protection” of her fifteen year-old daughter who had 
been struck by a car while riding her bicycle.22  At the appeals court level, a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s claims was overturned.23  The court found 
that the Michigan Supreme Court case of Berger v. Weber supported the notion that parental 
recovery for the loss of a child’s consortium was allowed.24  The Sizemore court reversed, 
finding that the laws of the state did not support such a cause of action.25 
                                                 
18 See id. at 936. 
19 See id. at 934-36. 
20 See infra notes 47-150 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 22-46 and accompanying text.  
22 See Sizemore v. Smock, 430 Mich. 283, 285-86 (1988) (citing Sizemore v. Smock, 155 Mich. App. 745, 746-47 
(1986)). 
23 See Sizemore, 430 Mich. At 286. 
24 See id.  See also Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1 (1981). 
25 See Sizemore, 430 Mich. at 299. 
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 For the purposes of background, in 1981 the Berger court addressed a child’s claim for 
the loss of parental society and companionship.26  Reversing the court of appeals, the court ruled 
that a cause of action for the loss of parental consortium was enforceable under Michigan law.27  
The court found support for its expansion in previous cases which allowed women to maintain a 
loss of consortium claim for their spouses,28 parents to sue for the loss of services of their 
children,29 and the Michigan Wrongful Death Statute,30 which allowed for such damages if the 
parent was killed.31  The court also dispensed with the defendant’s arguments that recognizing 
the cause of action would result in clogged court dockets, increased insurance premiums and 
uncertainty in the law with respect to figuring damages.32  Rather, the court found that the 
“importance of the child to our society merits more than lip service.  Convinced that we have too 
long treated the child as second-class citizen or some sort of nonperson, [sic] we feel constrained 
to remove the disability[, which is the inability to sue for loss of parental consortium damages,] 
we have imposed.”33 
                                                 
26 See Berger, 411 Mich. at 11.  Christine Berger was severely and permanently injured as result of an automobile 
accident with the defendant.  See id. at 10-11.  Berger, along with her husband, brought suit for a multitude of 
damages, including medical expenses, loss of wages and spousal consortium.  See id. at 11.  As next of friend, 
Berger’s husband brought suit on behalf of the couple’s handicapped daughter for loss of parental consortium.  See 
id.  Interestingly enough, the daughter died before final disposition of the case and no damages were sought on 
behalf of the Bergers’ minor son.  See id. at 11, n.2.   
27 See id.  
28 See Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33 (1960).  The wife of a driver who was injured an accident as a result of 
the defendant’s negligence brought suit for loss of consortium.  See Montgomery, 359 Mich. at 35.  Overturning 
precedent which had previously denied women the right to seek such compensation, the court stated “[t]he obstacles 
to the wife’s action were judge-invented and they are herewith judge-destroyed.”  Id. at 49. 
29 See Gumeinny v. Hess, 285 Mich. 411 (1938).  The plaintiff sought recovery for the loss of services of his minor 
son who was injured by the defendants.  See Gumeinny, 285 Mich. at 412.  The court reiterated the well-established 
rule that the parent is allowed to recover, in their own distinct cause of action, damages the parent incurs, including 
loss of services, when their child is tortuously injured.  See id. at 414-15. 
30 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922(6) (“In every action under this section, the court or jury may award damages 
as the court or jury shall consider fair and equitable . . . including . . . the loss of the society and companionship of 
the deceased.”). 
31 See Berger, 411 Mich. at 12-13 
32 See id. at 14-16. 
33 Id. at 17. 
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Beginning by stating it must “independently reexamine the various arguments and policy 
considerations” which supported previous expansion of the right of family members to seek 
consortium damages, including the decision in Berger, the Sizemore court sought to explain its 
reason for denying the mother’s claim.34  Acknowledging “the unique value inherent in the 
parent-child relationship and the importance to society in protecting it,” the court declined to 
further extend tortfeasor liability in this instance.35  Calling any consortium action an “anomaly” 
in the law of torts because compensation flows to an individual not directly injured by the 
tortfeasor’s behavior, the court addressed a multitude of policy arguments against recognizing a 
parent’s right to sue for the loss of filial consortium.36 
The court reasoned that “[s]ocial policy must intervene at some point to limit the extent 
of one’s liability” when considering the expansion the loss of consortium action to include filial 
consortium.37   Relying heavily on the dissent in Berger and citing the “intangible character of 
the loss” the opinion for the court found, among other arguments, that recovery of filial 
consortium damages would not redress any loss suffered by the parent of an injured child.38   
Rather, it would result in increased insurance premiums, increased financial and docket burdens 
on the courts and an increased probability of double recovery.39  The court also criticized the 
dissent for its inability to draw a line of liability for consortium damages, ruling that the majority 
“fail[ed] to see where such a point of demarcation should [more] logically begin” than ruling 
against the plaintiff.40   
                                                 
34 Sizemore, 430 Mich. at 290. 
35 Id. at 292. 
36 See id. at 292-93. 
37 Id. at 293 (citing Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977)). 
38 Id.  
39 See id. at 294-95 (quoting Berger, 411 Mich. at 36,41 (Levin, J., dissenting)). 
40 See Sizemore, 430 Mich. at 296.  The proper “point of demarcation,” as will be more thoroughly addressed later, 
should be determined by the legislature because, as this Sizemore court demonstrates, the judiciary has failed to 
place this line at a logical position. 
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The court also faced the plaintiff’s argument that because recovery for the loss of filial 
consortium by parents was allowed under the Michigan Wrongful Death Statute,41 so too should 
it be allowed when the child is tortuously injured.42  Relying once again on the dissent in Berger, 
the court noted that damage awards in a wrongful death action are “based on historical and 
policy considerations that are not applicable to negligence claims involving less grievous 
injury.”43  The Berger court reasoned “[i]f the primary victim of the accident may bring an 
action, there is no need to permit other family members to recover in order to provide some 
compensation for the family and to prevent the tortfeasor from escaping liability altogether.”44  
Further still, the Sizemore court found that although some jurisdictions had allowed parents 
recovery for filial consortium damages, a similar number had not, relying on many of the same 
policy considerations it had.45  Consequently, Michigan was placed solidly in the category of 
jurisdictions that did not recognize the cause of action.46 
III.    FLORIDA AND OHIO: RECOVERY ALLOWED BY JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
 A.  Florida 
 Standing in contrast to the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of the subject matter 
of this writing is the Supreme Court of Florida’s pronouncement in United States v. Dempsey.47  
In that case, the Court reached the opposite conclusion of the Michigan Supreme Court in 
Sizemore,48 finding that “a parent of a tortuously injured child has a right to recover for the 
permanent loss of filial consortium suffered as a result of a significant injury resulting in the 
                                                 
41 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922(6). 
42 See Sizemore, 430 Mich. at 296-97. 
43 Id. at 296.   
44 Berger, 411 Mich. at 48 (Levin, J., dissenting). 
45 See Sizemore, 430 Mich. at 298. 
46 See id. at 299. 
47 635 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1994).   
48 See Sizemore v. Smock, 430 Mich. 283, 299 (1988).   
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child’s permanent total disability.”49  Submitted as a certified question by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court addressed many familiar arguments and 
concerns regarding the expansion of the right to sue for filial consortium.50 
 Under the Federal Torts Claims Act, parents Pansy and Lonney Dempsey brought suit 
against the United States for, among other damages, the loss of society and companionship of 
their daughter.51   At birth, the Dempsey’s daughter became severely mentally retarded as a 
result of the negligence of doctors at Englin Air Force Base Hospital.52  After an award of $1.3 
million to the Dempseys for the loss of their daughter’s society and companionship in the district 
court, the Court of Appeals, upon appeal by the United States, certified a question to the Florida 
Supreme Court regarding Florida law in the matter.53  The question provided “[d]oes Florida law 
permit parents to recover for the loss of a child’s companionship and society when the child is 
severely injured?”54  The Florida court took up the matter, answering affirmative to the federal 
court’s inquiry.55 
 Arguing before the Florida Supreme Court, the United States maintained that the district 
court had misconstrued rulings by the Florida court in Wilke v. Roberts56 and Yordon v. Savage57 
in allowing the Dempseys to recover for the loss of their injured child’s society and 
                                                 
49 United States v. Dempsey, 635 So.2d 961, 965 (Fla. 1994). 
50 See Dempsey, 635 So.2d at 962.   
51 See United States v. Dempsey, 32 F.3d 1490, 1491-92 (1994).   
52 See Dempsey, 32 F.3d at 1492.   
53 See id.   The magistrate judge who heard the case at the district court level also ruled in favor of the Dempsey’s 
daughter, awarding her $2.8 million for medical expenses.  See id.  The United States did not appeal this portion of 
the magistrate’s decision, choosing instead to challenge the validity of the award of society and companionship 
damages to the parents.  See id.   
54 See id.  The Appeals Court certified an additional question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether 
“Florida law permit[s] parents to recover for the loss of the services of a severely injured child absent evidence of 
extraordinary income-producing abilities?”  See id.  This issue will not be addressed by this article. 
55 See Dempsey, 635 So.2d at 964. 
56 109 So. 225 (Fla. 1926). 
57 279 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1973). 
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companionship.58  Wilke involved the tortuous operation of an automobile by the defendant’s 
servant, resulting in serious injury to the plaintiff’s minor son.59  The court found that a “father’s 
right to the custody, companionship, services and earnings of his minor child are valuable rights 
. . . wrongful injury to which by a third person will support an action in favor of the father.”60  
Likewise, in Yordon, the court found that recognition of “the theoretical proposition that women 
should enjoy equal opportunities, right [sic], and responsibilities” allowed a tortuously injured 
child’s mother to seek the same remedies allowed a father by Wilke, including “the loss of the 
child’s companionship, society and services.”61  The Florida court disagreed with the United 
States’ assessment, finding that Wilke, Yordon and “our modern concept of family relationships” 
required allowing recovery for the Dempseys.62  Specifically, the court noted that it “appear[ed]” 
to have recognized the parents’ right of recovery in Wilke and Yordon.63   
Rather than resting entirely on appearances, the court went on to make a series of 
equitable arguments that it believed justified formal recognition of the cause of action.64  Noting 
that Florida had recognized the right of women to sue for spousal consortium65 and for children 
to sue for the loss of companionship of a parent,66 the court reasoned it was proper policy to 
consider that changing values and customs of society to recognize loss of society and 
                                                 
58 See Dempsey, 635 So.2d at 962.   
59 See Wilke v. Roberts, 109 So. 225, 226 (Fla. 1926) 
60 See Wilke, 109 So. at 227 (emphasis added). See also Dempsey, 635 So.2d at 963. 
61 Yordon v. Savage, 279 So.2d 844, 846-47.  In Yordon the minor child was rendered deaf and retarded as a result 
of the negligence of his pediatrician.  See Yordon, 279 So. 2d at 845.  Suit was brought on behalf of the minor by his 
parents and also by his parents individually to seek their own recovery for their son’s injuries.  See id.  See also 
Dempsey, 635 So.2d at 963. 
62 Id. at 964.   
63 See id.  
64 See id. 
65 See FLA. STAT. § 768.0415 (1993).  The statute states that “[a] person who, through negligence, causes significant 
permanent injury to the natural or adoptive parent of an unmarried dependent resulting in a permanent total 
disability shall be liable to the dependent for damages, including damages for permanent loss of services, comfort, 
companionship, and society.”  § 768.0415. 
66 See Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1971). 
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companionship as an element of damages that a parent may recover.67  The court also found that 
it was its privilege to make changes to the law when “common law rules are in doubt.”68  Today, 
the court stated, “children are valued for the love, affection, companionship and society they 
offer their parents” and are no longer viewed as servants or property of their parents.69  
Consequently, “[t]he loss of a child’s companionship and society is one of the primary losses 
that the parent of a severely injured child must endure.”70 
However, the court was careful to place limits on its enunciation of the parent’s right to 
sue for the loss of a child’s consortium.71  Defining the parent’s right to sue for the loss of the 
child’s consortium to mean “the loss of companionship, society, love, affection and solace of the 
injured child,” the court required that the loss must be as a result of “significant injury” which 
causes “permanent total disability” to the “child.”72  More recently, the court has held the ruling 
in Dempsey limits claims by parents for loss of a child’s consortium to minor children only.73  In 
sum, under Florida law, parents of minor children who are permanently disabled as a result of 
significant injury may seek recovery from the tortuous tortfeasor for the loss of their child’s 
consortium 
 B.  Ohio 
                                                 
67 See Dempsey, 635 So.2d at 964. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See id.  at 965. 
72 Id. 
73 See Cruz v. Broward County School Bd., 800 So.2d 213 (Fla. 2001).  In Cruz, a mother sued the school district for 
failing to provide adequate supervision when her mentally retarded fifteen year old son suffered a head injury in an 
altercation with another student at school.  See Cruz, 800 So.2d at 214.  The court found that Dempsey should not be 
construed to allow for damages for loss of the child’s consortium to extend into adulthood.  See id. at 217.  The court 
reasoned that under Florida law, “a parent is not entitled to any claim for damages when an adult child incurs 
personal injuries due to the tortious conduct of another.  It would make little sense to allow for damages into the 
adulthood of a child in the one instance but not in the other.”  Id.   
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 In much the same way as Florida has recognized the right of a parent to recover for the 
loss of a tortuously injured child’s consortium, so too has Ohio.74  In the 1993 Ohio Supreme 
Court case of Gallimore v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center, the court faced the sole issue of 
whether “parents of a minor child who is injured by a third-party tortfeasor may recover 
damages in a derivative action for loss of filial consortium.”75   Taking the view that “times have 
changed and so should the law,” the court expressly recognized a parent’s right to recover filial 
consortium damages as a result of the tortuous injury of their child.76 
 Factually, the Gallimore court addressed the issue when plaintiff brought suit on her 
infant son’s behalf and on her own behalf to recover damages from the Children’s Hospital as a 
result of an overdose of a ototoxic drug which rendered plaintiff’s son profoundly deaf.77  At the 
trial level, the plaintiff was awarded damages for the loss of her son’s “society.”78  Following a 
confusing set of affirmations, reversals and remands at the appeals and trial courts level, the 
Ohio Supreme Court took up the issue of “society” damages.79 
 Focusing largely on policy, the court sought legal support in a handful of previous cases, 
most notably in the 1877 case of Clark v. Bayer.80  In that case, the court grappled with damages 
claimed by the caretaker grandfather of minor children who were wrongfully taken from him by 
the children’s biological parents.81  Specifically with respect to the consortium issue, the 
Gallimore court focused on the Clark court’s conclusion that the grandfather could seek 
                                                 
74 See Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993).   
75 See Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1054. 
76 Id. at 1056. 
77 See id. at 1052. 
78 See id.  
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 1054-1055. See also Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 1877 WL 120 (Ohio 1877).   
81 See Clark, 32 Ohio St. at 300-1. 
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damages for the “services of the minors, without averring their ability serve him”82 to be 
dispositive.83  The Gallimore court reasoned that that  
the court in Clark did recognize a “parental” right to maintain a general damage 
claim based up “the right to service,” despite acknowledging that the infant 
children were incapable of rendering valuable services.  Thus, the only “services” 
that the infant children could realistically have provided the plaintiff during the 
period of abduction were society, companionship, comfort, love and solace, i.e., 
elements of “consortium.”84 
 
As such, Clark was found support the notion that Ohio recognized the right of a parent to sue for 
the loss of consortium of a tortuously injured child.85 
 From an additional legal standpoint, the court noted that Ohio’s Wrongful Death 
Statute86 provides for loss of consortium damages when a family member is wrongfully killed.87  
In dealing with that issue, the court simply noted “it would be incongruous to deny parents 
recover for loss of the society and companionship of a seriously injured child while recognizing 
that such losses are compensable in cases involving death.”88 
 In further policy analysis, replete with stirring pronouncements regarding the role of the 
judiciary branch in the evolving nature of the law, the court dismissed several arguments against 
the extension of the consortium cause of action.89  The first of these arguments was the difficulty 
in measuring consortium damages.90  Stating that there is no historical basis for this argument, 
including the fact that there has been no trouble figuring consortium damages when already 
                                                 
82 Id. at 312. 
83 See Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1054-55 
84 Id.  
85 See id. at 1057. 
86 See OHIO STAT. § 2125.02 (Baldwin’s 2001). 
87 See Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1057.  Note this is the same situation faced by the Michigan Supreme Court with 
regard to the inconsistency between the Michigan Wrongful Death Statute and Michigan common law on the issue.  
See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
88 Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1057. 
89 See id. at 1057-60.  For example, the court noted “[w]e can find no specific common-law impediments to recovery 
for such losses.  If there were any, they would be devoid of rational justification in the modern law.”  Id. at 1057.  
The court further noted  “[t]he common law is not static.  It is dynamic, and it must continue to evolve to keep up 
with the times.”  Id. at 1059. 
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allowed by the law, the court dismissed the defendant’s argument.91  By highlighting the value 
of the parent/child relationship in society, the court also dismissed the slippery slope argument 
that recognition of right of the right of a parent to sue for the loss of a child’s consortium would 
lead to recognition of similar rights between aunts, cousins and other family relationships.92   
Further arguments included fear of double recovery and the requirement of attaching a 
value to the parent child relationship to which the court rebutted by stating its confidence in the 
jury’s ability to award proper damages.93  The final argument brought before the court was the 
matter was best left to the legislature.94  Once again reiterating its pivotal role in the 
development of the law, the court stated “[w]hen the common law has been out of step with the 
times, and the legislature, for whatever reason, has not acted, we have undertaken to change the 
law, and rightfully so.  After all, who presides over the common law but the courts?”95  The 
court, answering it’s own query, felt it did, expanding the cause of action to include parents 
suing for damages as a result of a third-party tortfeasor’s actions which result in the injury of a 
child.  Specifically, the new right included “the parent’s loss of the services, society, 
companionship, comfort, love and solace of the injured child.”96 
 On its own initiative, the Gallimore court continued on to address and overrule its own 
decision on parental consortium in High v. Howard.97  In that ruling, issued one year earlier, the 
court addressed the question of whether a child could sue a tortfeasor for the loss of parental 
                                                                                                                                                             
90 See id. at 1058. 
91 See id. 
92 See Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1058. 
93 See id. at 1058-59. 
94 See id. 
95 Id. at 1059. 
96 Id. at 1054. 
97 See id. at 1060. 
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consortium when the tortfeasor injures the child’s parent.98  Citing precedent and rejecting 
arguments that other jurisdictions had recognized the cause of action, the court declined “to 
recognize a new cause of action for loss of parental consortium because we believe the 
responsibility for changing public policy to permit recovery for loss of parental consortium rests 
with the General Assembly, not this court.”99  Instead, the Gallimore court declared the dissent 
in the four-to-three “unfair and legally unjustifiable” decision in High to be persuasive on the 
issue.100  Thus, in one case the Ohio Supreme Court had recognized two rights to recover for loss 
of consortium.101 
IV.   NEW YORK: RECOVERY NOT ALLOWED BY THE JUDICIARY 
 Similar to Michigan, but in contrast with Florida and Ohio, New York courts have 
chosen to not to recognize a parent’s right to sue for any non-pecuniary damages, including the 
loss of filial consortium, when their child is injured by a third-party tortfeasor.102  However, 
New York courts have maintained adherence to a 1946 decision by the New York Court of 
Appeals that limited the damages which a parent could recover for losses sustained as a result of 
a child’s injury.103  Unlike the interpretations of the jurisdictions already explored in this paper, 
                                                 
98 See High v. Howard, 592 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1992).  Plaintiffs in High were brothers, both minors, whose father 
was seriously injured as a result of the negligent driving of the defendant.  See High, 529 N.E.2d at 818.  See also 
Kane v. Quigley, 203 N.E.2d 338 (Ohio 1964) (finding that there is no basis for a child to maintain a suit for a loss 
of parental consortium). 
99 High, 592 N.E.2d at 820.  In further soaring rhetoric, the Gallimore court noted  
[o]ur critics may wish to perpetuate an anachronistic and sterile view of the relationship between 
parents and children, but we seek to distance ourselves from that viewpoint.  Either the common 
law must be modernized to conform with present-day norms, or it will engender a lack of respect 
as being out of touch with the realities or our time. 
Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1060 
100 Id.  The bulk of the dissent’s argument in High rested on distinguishing the facts of High from the 1964 
case of Kane v. Quigley, 203 N.E.2d 338, which the majority had relied upon in denying the cause of action 
for parental consortium.  See High, 592 N.E.2d at 821-23.  The court also relied heavily upon the argument 
that many other states had allowed the right to recover for the loss of parental consortium.  See id. at 823. 
101 See id. at 821. 
102 See Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery, Inc., 67 N.E.2d 270 (N.Y. App. 1946). 
103 See Devito v. Opiach, 627 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (plaintiff-parents were not allowed recovery 
for non-pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s negligence during childbirth which caused the infant to 
suffer from cerebral palsy).  
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no New York court has yet to address the filial consortium claim in an explanative nature in any 
single opinion.  Instead, New York courts follow, in general and usually without question, the 
decision of Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery in the matter.104   
 In Gilbert, the infant plaintiff’s mother brought, along with the infant’s claims, a claim 
for damages resulting from the deprivation “of the companionship, and services of her infant 
daughter.”105  At issue was an instruction which charged the jury to award damages, if 
appropriate, to the mother for the loss of her daughter’s services and companionship.106  The 
plaintiff argued the jury instruction, although in error, should be disregarded.107  The court 
disagreed, noting that the loss of companionship instruction was an “improper element of 
damages.”108  Rather, under New York law the only damages a minor’s mother is allowed to 
recover from a third-party tortfeasor who injured the minor is the “pecuniary loss she sustained 
thereby including the value of her daughter’s services, if any, of which she was deprived and 
reasonable expenses necessarily incurred by the mother in an effort to restore the infant to 
health.”109  As such, New York law does not recognize the right of a parent to recover non-
pecuniary damages, such as loss of consortium, for the tortuous injury of their child by a third-
party.110 
 Another case frequently cited by New York courts addressing filial consortium claims is 
Foti v. Quittel.111  Relying solely on Gilbert, the Foti court reversed a jury award for the plaintiff 
which exceeded special damages for injuries suffered by the plaintiff’s child that had been 
                                                 
104 See Devito, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 442; Thomas v. New York City, 814 F. Supp. 1139, 1154 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (mother 
was denied recover for the loss of society and companionship of her eight children who were removed from her by 
state protective services and were subsequently exposed to years of abuse in foster homes). 
105 See Gilbert, 67 N.E.2d at 156. 
106 See id.  
107 See id. at 157. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 157 (citing Barnes v. Keene, 132 N.Y. 13 (1892)). 
110 See id. 
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proved at trial.112  The court reasoned that the only way the jury award could have been so high 
is if loss of the child’s services were included, which were not proved at trial, or if the loss of 
filial consortium was included, “which is not compensable” under New York law.113  Recent 
New York cases have followed this adherence to the denial of parents’ claims for the loss of 
filial consortium as well.114   In fact, New York courts do not allow for recovery of any non-
pecuniary damages for suits arising out of injury to the parent-child relationship.115  Thus, 
although failing to address filial consortium damage claims in such an exhaustive nature as some 
other states, New York courts have repeatedly ruled that no such cause of action exists under the 
state’s laws. 
V.   ILLINOIS: “DIRECT” VERSUS “INDIRECT” 
 Adding yet another twist to the filial consortium analysis is the Illinois interpretation of 
the parent’s right to recovery for the loss of a child’s consortium as the result of the acts of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
111 241 N.Y.S.2d 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963). 
112 See Foti v. Quittel, 241 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963).  In Foti, the jury awarded the plaintiff-mother 
$3,000 for damages claimed as the result of tortuous injury to her plaintiff-daughter.  See Foti, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 16. 
113 Id. at 17 (citing Gilbert, 67 N.E.2d 155). 
114 See Martell v. Boardwalk Enterprises, Inc., 748 F.2d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff-parents were denied 
recovery for the loss of their sixteen year old son’s consortium after he lost his arm and suffered other severe 
injuries in a boating accident); Devito, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 442; Thomas, 814 F. Supp. at 1154; Mosher-Simons v. 
Allegany, 1997 WL 662512 at 15 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (plaintiff-mother was denied damages for the loss of consortium 
of her infant son who was taken from her by state protective services and subsequently killed by the infant’s aunt 
who had been awarded custody of him). 
115 See DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).  In DeAngelis, a mother 
sought recovery on behalf of her three children for the loss of her society, companionship and other consortium-type 
damages for her physician’s negligence during her tubal ligation.  See DeAngelis, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 190.  A 
companion case consolidated with the previous case dealt with claims for loss of parental consortium damages 
brought on behalf of two minors who’s mother had been negligently injured in an automobile accident.  See id. at 
190-91.  In both cases, the court denied recover for the loss of parental consortium.  See id. at 195-96.  Using what is 
by now familiar language, the court found that  
on the basis of public policy and the results which would arise upon recognition of this types of 
claim, such as the additional burden placed on society through increased costs of insurance and the 
added expense of litigation and settlement, and in the interest of limiting the legal consequences of 
a wrong to a controllable degree, we decline to recognize a new cause of action on behalf of a 
child for the loss of parental consortium.  We do not pretend to doubt the harm experienced by a 
child upon the loss of parental care, companionship, guidance, love and training. 
Id. at 195. 
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third-party tortfeasor.116  The Illinois Supreme Court has chosen to allow a cause of action for 
the deprivation of filial consortium in some instances and deny it in others.117  On one hand, the 
court has chosen to allow parental claims for the loss of a child’s society and companionship 
when they are not derivative in nature.118  On the other, Illinois law denies parents the same 
recovery if the parent’s claim is “the derivative consequence of an injury to the child.”119  This 
distinction was first enunciated in the 1988 Illinois Supreme Court case of Dralle v. Ruder.120  In 
that case, the plaintiffs were a husband and wife and their infant son who was born with severe 
birth defects as a result of a prescription drug taken by the mother during pregnancy.121  The 
court found that because the parents’ action was a derivative cause of action of the their son’s 
claims, no recovery for loss of consortium would be allowed.122 
 The court’s reasoning in the matter took many forms, including the notation of the 
Illinois Courts of Appeals’ repeated failure to allow both parents to seek recovery for the loss of 
filial consortium and for children to seek the loss of parental consortium.123  The court also 
refused the parents’ argument that the court’s construction of the Illinois Wrongful Death statute 
should be interpreted to allow recovery in their situation.124  The court found that although the 
statute specifically allowed pecuniary damages and had been recognized by the court to also 
authorize non-pecuniary damages, including consortium claims, such recovery was allowed in 
wrongful death actions only.125  Citing several previous decisions, the court noted that it was the 
                                                 
116 See Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. 1988). 
117 See Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 214-15. 
118 See id. at 214. 
119 Id.   
120 See id. at 214-15. 
121 See id. at 209-10 
122 See id. at 215. 
123 See Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 210-11 
124 See id. at 211.   
125 See id. (citing Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 1984)).  In Bullard, the parents of a seventeen year old 
boy brought a wrongful death action after the boy was killed in an automobile accident with a truck.  See Bullard, 
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policy of the state to allow non-pecuniary damage recovery in wrongful death actions because 
such actions were the result of the complete loss of a family member.126  The court reasoned that 
recovery should not be allowed because “the nonfatally injured victim retains his [or her] own 
cause of action against the tortfeasor.”127  The court also cautioned that allowing parents to seek 
recovery for the loss of an injured child’s consortium would create risks of increased liability, 
duplicative recovery as well as result in difficulty in figuring damages.128 
 The Dralle court’s most important pronouncements came with respect to its distinction 
of previous Illinois cases wherein recovery for the loss of filial consortium had been allowed.129  
In Dymek v. Nyquist, the court of appeals allowed a father to recover for the loss of his minor 
child’s society and companionship from the child’s mother and psychiatrist.130  Relying on 
previous Illinois court decisions that expanded the right to recover for the loss of consortium of a 
loved one, the court stated that “it is our opinion that we should now recognize a cause of action 
for parental loss of a minor child’s society and companionship.”131  Similarly, the Federal 
District Court in Kunz v. Dietch applied Illinois law to grant a father loss of society damages 
against his daughter’s maternal grandparents.132  Noting that the Illinois Supreme Court had not 
                                                                                                                                                             
468 N.E.2d at 1230-31.  The court found that because the Illinois Wrongful Death Act had already been construed to 
allow non-pecuniary loss recovery for cases which involved the loss of a parent or spouse, the parents were allowed 
recovery for the loss of their son’s “society” under the Act.  See id. at 1233. 
126 Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 211 (citing Hall v. Gillins, 147 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1958) (court found that the wrongful death 
statute precluded any common law actions because the statute provided for both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
losses of the wife a child of an individual killed in a car accident).  See also Elliot v. Willis, 442 N.E.2d 163, 168 
(Ill. 1982) (The wife of a driver killed as a result of the defendant’s negligence in a car accident was allowed to 
recover for the loss of her husband’s “companionship and conjugal relations” under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act 
because the Act “is intended to provide the surviving spouse the benefits that would have been received from the 
continued life of the decedent.”). 
127 Id. at 212. 
128 See id. at 213. 
129 See id. at 214-15. 
130 See Dymek v. Nyquist, 469 N.E.2d 659, 666 (Ill. 1984). 
131 Dymek, 469 N.E.2d at 666. (citing Bullard, 445 N.E.2d 485, Elliot, 442 N.E.2d 163 and Hall, 147 N.E.2d 352). 
132 See Kunz v. Dietch, 660 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1987).  In Kunz, the father sought loss of society damages after 
his infant daughter’s maternal grandparents tried to put her up for adoption and prevent him from seeing her after 
her mother died from heart disease.  See Kunz, 660 F. Supp. at 680-81. 
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yet ruled in the matter, the court reasoned that given the chance, the Supreme Court would allow 
the father to recover.133  The federal court’s premonition proved incorrect. 
In ruling against the parents in Dralle, the court distinguished Dymek and Kunz based 
upon the procedural nature of the cases.134  While Dymek and Kunz involved direct actions by 
the parent unaccompanied by any action by the child for his or her own injuries, Dralle involved 
parents’ claims as a derivative, or indirect, consequence of the child’s injuries.135  In summary, 
as long as the parent’s action for the loss of a child’s consortium as the result of the acts of a 
third party tortfeasor are not derivative of the child’s claim, the parent’s claim will be allowed.136   
VI.   MASSACHUSETTS: THE STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION 
 Adding yet another twist to interpreting a cause of action for filial consortium is 
Massachusetts.  In Massachusetts, legislation which grants parents the right to sue for loss of 
consortium of children injured by a third-party tortfeasor was enacted in 1989.137  The statute 
recites that “[t]he parents of a minor child or an adult child who is dependent on his [or her] 
parents for support shall have a cause of action for loss of consortium of the child who has been 
seriously injured against any person who is legally responsible for causing such injury.”138  
Interestingly, this statute is the Massachusetts legislature’s response to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court decision of Norman v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, wherein the 
court ruled that parents had no right to recover for the loss of a child’s consortium from a third-
party tortfeasor.139 
                                                 
133 See id. at 683.  The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Dralle was published in 1988, almost a year after the 
Kunz decision’s publication in 1987. 
134 See Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 214-15. 
135 See id. 
136 See, e.g., Doe v. McKay, 700 NE.2d 1018, 1025 (Ill. 1998) (recognizing the distinction made in Dralle between 
allowing recovery for filial consortium in “direct” actions and not allowing it in “indirect” actions). 
137 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85X (2001). 
138 Id. 
139 See Norman v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 529 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1988). 
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 In Norman, the court addressed parents’ claims for the loss of consortium of their son 
who was severely injured as a result of being run over by a Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority vehicle.140  The court began by noting that it had previously recognized causes of 
action for loss of spousal141 and parental consortium,142 but warned that it had to limit a 
defendant’s liability, “[o]therwise society’s exposure to threat of financial ruin will be 
intolerable.”143  The court also found that because “ordinarily minor children are critically 
dependent on their parents for the spiritual and physical necessities of life,” recognizing a cause 
of action for loss of parental consortium did not necessitate the need for recognition of filial 
consortium actions.144  Thus, the court found that the nature of the relationship and the 
dependency the uninjured family members had on the injured party was the point of distinction 
which allowed the court to rule against the parents.145  Additionally, the court disposed of the 
plaintiffs’ argument that because the Massachusetts’s wrongful death statute allowed recover for 
the loss of filial consortium, so too should courts recognize it for the tortuous injury of a child.146  
Conversely, the court reasoned that allowing such a recovery would effectuate a double 
recovery, whereas in wrongful death actions “no one recovers for the losses sustained by the 
deceased party.”147 
 Following the enactment of Massachusetts’s statute allowing recover for the loss of filial 
consortium, courts, including the Massachusetts Supreme Court which issued the ruling in 
Norman, began interpreting and applying the new statute.  In Monahan v. Town of Methuen, the 
                                                 
140 See Norman, 529 N.E.2d at 139-40 (“[W]e observe that the complaint is silent with respect to whether Matthew 
was an adult or a minor, and was emancipated or unemancipated when the accident occurred.  Neither fact is 
essential to our resolution of the consortium issue.”). 
141 See id. at 140 (citing Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 1973)). 
142 See id. (citing Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons., Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980)). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. at 141. 
146 See Norman, 529 N.E.2d at 142. 
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court construed statutory language that “in order to be considered ‘dependent on his [or her] 
parents for support,’ that child must be, at the very least financially dependent on his [or her] 
parents, either prior to or after the accident, or both.”148  Leibovich v. Antonellis dealt with 
whether the statute could be applied retroactively.149  The court found that the legislature had 
intended the bill to apply retroactively, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed with their filial 
consortium claims and that the statute did not violate the U.S. Constitution.150  Therefore, under 
Massachusetts statutory law, parents are allowed to seek damages for the loss of consortium of a 
severely injured child who is dependent on them.  
VII. CONSORTIUM POLICY BACKGROUND 
 A.   Patriarchal Consortium 
 The right of a husband to sue for the loss of consortium based upon his relationship with 
the injured party, be it his wife, servant or child is rooted in early Roman Law.151  At common 
law, the patriarch would file suit “per quod consortium amisit.”152  The rationale was that the 
husband, as master of his household, held a proprietary interest in not only his land and animals, 
                                                                                                                                                             
147 Id. 
148 See Monahan v. Town of Methuen, 558 N.E.2d 951, 957 (Mass. 1990). In that case, plaintiff Robert J. Monahan, 
a full-time firefighter, was severely injured after falling fifty-two feet from a hose-drying tower.  See Monahan, 558 
N.E.2d at 953.  Prior to and following his lengthy stay in the hospital, the plaintiff lived with his parents, paying 
them modest rent and helping out with household chores.  See id.  Robert’s parents joined in his lawsuit claiming 
their own damages, including for the loss of his consortium under the Massachusetts statute which allows parents to 
seek damages for filial consortium discussed here.  See id. at 956.  The court denied the parents’ claim, finding that 
Robert was not financially dependent upon them and thus did not meet the dependency requirement of the statute.  
See id.  
149 See Leibovich v. Antonellis, 574 N.E.2d 978 (Mass. 1991).  In Leibovich, Philip Leibovich and his parents 
brought suit for severe injuries he suffered in a car accident.  See Leibovich, 574 N.E.2d at 980.  The jury awarded 
Philip $5,500,000 for his injuries and each parent $250,000 for the loss of Philip’s consortium.  See id. at 981.  The 
judgment was affirmed.  See id. at 986. 
150 See id. at 983-84.  The constitutional challenges argued by the defendant included the argument that the 
retroactive application of the statute violated his due process rights and that the scope of the statute was excessive.  
See id. at 984-86. 
151 See Michael A. Mogill, And Justice For Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the Child’s Action for Loss of 
Parental Consortium, 24 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1321, 1327 (1992). See also Evan Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of 
Consortium, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1923) (“Under the common law, a husband’s right to the consortium of his wife 
was clear and definite.”). 
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but also in his wife, children and servants.153  In large part, actions brought by the patriarch for 
consortium focused on the economic nature of the loss.154  The patriarch sought damages for the 
loss of services he suffered as the result of the tortuous injury of his wife,155 children or 
servants.156  Less sensitively put, the husband sought recovery for injury to “his interest in 
her.”157  However, the husband was not allowed to seek sentimental damages caused by the 
injury of his wife because “the wife’s legal identity, having been merged with her husband’s at 
marriage, left her a non-person in the eyes of the law.”158  In other words, the wife remained 
nothing more than a servant to her husband, recognized by the law for only the economic benefit 
she provided her husband.159  
 Later, the courts began to recognize that a husband had the right to sentimental and 
emotional damages stemming from the tortuous injury of his wife.160   During the 1600’s, courts 
acknowledged that a husband had a right to the “service” of a conjugal relationship with his 
wife.161  As a result, courts began allowing husbands whose wives had been injured to seek 
sentimental consortium damages from a third-party tortfeasor.162  Today, these consortium 
damages include such “intangible elements as love, society, companionship, and affection.”163  
                                                                                                                                                             
152 Mogill, supra note 150 at 1327 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1141 (6th Ed. 1990)).  In English, per quod 
consortium amisit means “whereby he lost the company of his wife.”   
153 See Thomas A. Demetrio, Loss of Consortium: A Continuing Evolution, 36 Trial 42, 42 (2000). 
154 See Mogill , supra note 150 at 1327. 
155 See Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 651, 653 (1930) (“[T]he  foundation of 
the husband’s right of action for loss of consortium is based upon the idea that the wife is her husband’s servant, 
since an interference with the service of a servant is an actionable trespass.”).   
156 See id. 
157 Holbrook, supra note 150 at 2 (quoting 4 Bac. Abr. 552 (Marriage and Divorce)).   
158 Mogill , supra note 150 at 1327. 
159 See id.   
160 See Demetriot, supra note 152 at 42. 
161 See Lippman, supra note 154 at 656. 
162 See Demetriot, supra note 152 at 42.. 
163 Mogill, supra note 150 at 1328. 
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Consequently, it is extremely well-settled that a husband has a right to sue for the loss of his 
wife’s consortium if she is injured by a third-party tortfeasor.164   
 B.   Spousal Consortium 
 In contrast to a patriarch’s right to sue for the loss of his “possession’s” consortium, 
stands the wife’s reciprocal right.  At the time the husband’s right seek consortium damages was 
recognized, a number of reasons were proffered which denied women the right to seek the same 
damages.165  Many argued that because when a woman was married, her identity merged into 
that of her husband’s and any recovery by the husband in tort would make the family whole; 
recovery by the wife for consortium damages would be duplicative.166  It was also argued that 
because the wife was her husband’s property, she could suffer no damages to any item that could 
be judicially remedied because she had no converse property interest in her husband.167  Not the 
least of these arguments was a procedural one.168  Under common law rules, “a married woman 
was incapable of suing except when her husband was joined as plaintiff, an under which the 
husband was entitled to the proceeds of any suit.”169  In other words, a woman may have had the 
common law right to sue for the loss of her husband’s consortium, but procedural obstructions 
prevented her from exercising that right.170 
 The denial of a woman’s right to sue for lost consortium began to erode with the passage 
by most states of Married Women’s Property Acts, which, in part, abolished the notion that 
husbands were “entitled” to their wives’ services.171  In effect, the Married Women’s Property 
                                                 
164 All states recognize that “[a]ny tort causing direct physical injury to one spouse will give rise to a claim for loss 
of consortium by the other.”  See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 125 at 932 (5th ed. 1984). 
165 See Holbrook, supra note 150 at 2. 
166 See Mogill, supra note 150 at 1327-29. 
167 See Demetrio, supra note 152 at 42. 
168 See Holbrook, supra note 150 at 2. 
169 Id. 
170 See id. at 3. 
171 See id. at 4, 7.  See also Demetrio, supra note 142 at 42. 
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Acts took the  “historical basis for these [consortium] actions – loss of services – [and] collapsed 
[them into] a new one, violation of inherent marital rights.”172   However, these types of 
legislation presented courts with a whole new set of conceptual problems, including whether the 
husband still retained his own independent cause of action.173  At the outset, a wife could 
generally sue for any intentional act that resulted in the loss of her husband’s consortium.174  
This included the right to sue for enticement, criminal conversation, alienation of affections, and 
“the sale to the husband of excessive quantities of drugs.”175  The reason this distinction existed 
was that when the husband was negligently injured, he retained his own cause of action against 
the tortfeasor, whereas in the cases of criminal conversation and the like, he did not.176  It took 
several more years before married women were allowed to seek consortium damages for their 
negligently injured husbands.  
 In the 1950 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia case of Hitaffer v. 
Argonne, Co., the right of a woman to sue for the loss of her negligently injured husband’s 
consortium was first expressly recognized.177  The court criticized prior court interpretations of 
common law denying married women of such a cause of action as “nothing more than an 
arbitrary separation of the various elements of consortium devised to circumvent the logic of 
allowing the wife of such an action.”178  Essentially, the court rested its decision on the fact that 
it could “conceive of no reasons for denying the wife this right for the reason that in this 
                                                 
172 Lippman, supra note 154 at 664. 
173 See id. at 654, 662 (“In more modern times, the basis of the action comes into conflict with a change in the 
position of the woman, and so old concepts have to be re-examined and made to suit new conditions.”). 
174 See Holbrook, supra note 150 at 6.  See also Lippman, supra note 154 at 664 (“That which previously accrued to 
the husband alone by reason of his superiority, is extended to the wife who has become his equal.”). 
175 Lippman, supra note 154 at 662-63. 
176 See Holbrook, supra note 150 at 6. 
177 See Hitaffer v. Argonne, Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (overruled in part by Smither and Co. v. Coles, 242 
F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957)). 
178 Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 813.  In Hitaffer, the plaintiff’s husband had been severely injured at work as the result of 
his employer’s negligence.  See id. at 812. 
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enlightened day and age they simply do not exist.”179  Acknowledging that all prior authority 
was inconsistent with the manner in which the court was ruling, the court rejected the argument 
that the wife’s cause of action was more remote than the husband’s.180  Rather, the court found 
that negligent injuries to the marital relationship were no less direct and damaging as intentional 
injuries to the marital relationship.181  The court rejected arguments that the wife had no right to 
the services of her husband’s, dismissing the notion of consortium actions as essentially loss of 
service actions as “an outworn fiction, and the wife’s interest in the undisturbed relation of her 
consort no less worthy of protection than that of the husband.”182  Many states followed the 
example set by the Hitaffer court.  Today, forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
recognize a married woman’s right to seek damages for the loss of her negligently injured 
husband’s consortium.183 
 C.   Parental and Filial Consortium 
As demonstrated by the previous sections of this paper, courts today continue to struggle 
with the ongoing evolution of the loss of consortium action in the context of parental and filial 
relationships.184   Suffice it to say that arguments in favor of wholesale recognition of such 
causes of action primarily lie with “logic, fairness, and recognition of the value of the parent-
child relationship.”185  At common law, the patriarch of the family was allowed the right to seek 
damages for tortuous interference with this relationship with his children.186  Development of 
consortium actions in the parent-child relationship mirrors, in part, the development of 
                                                 
179 Id. at 819. 
180 See id. at 815, 819 (“The medieval concepts of the marriage relation to which other jurisdictions have reverted in 
order to reach the results which have been handed to us as evidence of the law have long since ceased to have any 
meaning.”).  See also Mogill, supra note 150 at 1332. 
181 See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 817. 
182 Id. at 818. 
183 See Mogill, supra note 150 at 1333-34 n.68.   
184 See supra Parts II-VI. 
185 Demetrio, supra note 152 at 43. 
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reciprocal spousal consortium claims.187  Today, consortium actions by parents and children, 
when allowed, do not focus on the service component which dominated such actions in earlier 
American jurisprudence.188  Instead, such actions have been allowed based upon policies of 
valuing the somewhat intangible emotional nature of the plaintiff’s loss.189    
VIII.  CONSORTIUM OR CONFUSION?  
 It has long been accepted that the purpose of tort actions are to compensate the victims of 
the intentional or negligent acts of others.  Many times the aim is to make the plaintiff whole, or 
to attempt put them in the same position as they were before the event in question occurred.  
When it comes to claims for loss of filial consortium, varying rationales, justifications and 
interpretations demonstrated by the five states addressed here seem nebulous and in flux.  In 
short, the law with respect to consortium claims in the parent-child relationship is a frustrating 
mess.  However, the aim of this paper is to shed light on policy rationales upon which a 
legislature may base a clear set of rules which establish a logical and just cause of action for the 
loss of consortium. 
While perhaps it was the view of the Framers that varying interpretations of the law 
would result state-to-state, the condition of filial consortium law today leaves much to be 
desired.  Piece-meal judicial decision-making in the matter have resulted in the large variations 
seen today in whether certain types of consortium damages may be sought.  Courts like the Ohio 
Supreme Court have thrown caution to the wind, making stirring pronouncements about their 
powers to change the law that would shock the conscience of even some judicial activists, not to 
mention laying waste to the beliefs of any philosophy of restraint.  Still other courts, such as 
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Michigan and Illinois, exercise restraint, but at a point that does not make sense.  Finally, courts 
like those in New York take an all or nothing approach to consortium damages in the parent-
child relationship, limiting its availability to spouses.  What is needed is clear legislation, such as 
the case in Massachusetts, which clearly identifies the nature and extent of consortium damages 
which may be sought.  
A.   Judicial Fiat: Ohio and Florida 
Sounding more like political campaign ad then a court, the Ohio Supreme Court used 
lofty judicial rhetoric in Gallimore v.  Children’s Hospital Medical Center to create a new cause 
of action.190  Samples of the court’s overblown dicta is evident in the section above describing 
its decision in the matter.191  Statements the court made in finding that parents had a right to 
recover for the loss of an injured child’s filial consortium included the thought that “[t]he 
common law is ever-evolving and we have the duty, absent action by the General Assembly on a 
specific question, to be certain that the law keeps up with the ever-changing needs of modern 
society.”192  The legislative and executive branches of Ohio state government should beware, the 
judiciary has just named itself emperor.  While the importance of the parent-child relationship 
should not be discounted, the Gallimore court’s hard-charging verbiage shocks the conscience.  
Nearly admitting that issues such as this should be left to the legislature, the court prods forward 
and dictates new rights.193   
The court does deserve commendation, however, for its consistency.  In finding that 
parents could seek recovery from a tortfeasor for the loss of their child’s society and 
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companionship, the court goes one step further.194   Without any evidence of prompting, the 
court overruled its previous decision to allow children to seek damages for the loss of parental 
consortium.195  Thus, in Ohio the streak goes in both directions under Gallimore.196  Both 
parents and children are allowed to seek recovery for the loss of consortium when the other is 
intentionally or negligently injured by a third-party tortfeasor.197 
Exercising a somewhat more palatable level of restraint, the Florida Supreme Court in 
United States v. Dempsey noted that the apparent “unjust” nature of the current law required it to 
recognize a parent’s right to seek filial consortium damages.198  However, the court sought cover 
from judicial restraint-based criticism by noting that previous cases dealing with damages for 
parents of injured children seemed to roll consortium-type damages such as companionship 
under the ambit of services.199  Unfortunately, the court goes further, finding that it has a duty to 
abrogate common law “when change is demanded by public necessity or required to vindicate 
fundamental rights.”200  It seems unlikely that many would agree that the right to seek filial 
consortium damages, in addition to other damages that are available in tort, is a fundamental 
right.  Furthermore, it is the role of the legislature to respond to the cries of the public, not the 
judiciary.  Both the Florida and Ohio Supreme Courts seem to forget this notion. 
B.   Judicial Confusion: Michigan and Illinois 
Most confusingly of all are the Michigan and Illinois Supreme Court decisions on the 
matter of parental recovery of filial consortium damages.  In an attempt to draw a line to prevent 
further expansion of a plaintiff’s right to seek damages in tort, the Michigan court in Sizemore v. 
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Smock effectuates more of a squiggle then a straight line.201  The court acknowledged its 
previous decisions which allow a child to seek recovery for the loss of a parent’s consortium but 
denied the Sizemore parent the same recovery.202  Rather, the court recognized “that any 
decision to further extend a negligent tortfeasor’s liability for consortium damages should be 
determined by the Legislature.”203  It is granted that the law is filled with inconsistencies, but 
why should it be left to the legislature to decide a question of consortium damages in one 
instance and not in the other?    
The Illinois Supreme Court, on the other hand, attempts to remedy inconsistencies in its 
decisions in the matter.  The court in Dralle v. Ruder draws the line with respect to filial 
consortium claims between derivative claims and non-derivative claims.204  Like the Michigan 
court in Sizemore, the Illinois court tries to reconcile its previous decisions by drawing a line at 
which liability for tortfeasors ends.205  In reality, the Dralle court ends up with more of a 
squiggle then a line as well.  As discussed previously, the Dralle court distinguished previous 
cases which allowed parents to recover for the loss of filial consortium on the basis of the fact 
that there was no action for injury on the part of the child.206  However, this distinction does not 
hold up under many circumstances.   
For example, assume the facts of a case are as the were in Kunz v. Deitch, which the 
Dralle court distinguished, wherein a widowed father sued for the loss of his infant child’s 
consortium when the child’s maternal grandparents had attempted to put the child up for 
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adoption without his knowledge.207  The court reasoned filial consortium damages were allowed 
in that situation because the father’s claim was not derivative of the infants.208  Nevertheless, the 
infant could have easily had claims brought on his behalf for any damages he might have 
suffered as a result of being wrongfully kept from his father.  Under the reasoning in Dralle, the 
father’s claim for the loss of filial consortium could not prevail because it would be derivative of 
any claims the infant now made.  Once again, the Illinois Supreme Court should have left if up 
to the legislature.  Instead, it chose to establish a confusing distinction which could be easily 
circumvented by any intelligent plaintiff’s lawyer. 
C.   All or Nothing: New York 
New York courts hold an unwavering opinion that consortium damages should not be 
expanded to the parent-child relationship.209  Rather than allowing consortium damages in some 
instances of the parent-child relationship and denying it in others, New York law does not allow 
for the recovery of any pecuniary non-pecuniary damages for parents or children when the other 
is injured by a third-party tortfeasor.210  Warming the hearts of those adhering to the belief that 
judicial restraint is the proper means of interpreting the law, consortium damages in New York 
are confined to their original common law station, the spousal relationship.   
D.   Getting it Right: Massachusetts 
Of all the states’ views disseminated in this writing, the most sense comes from the 
Massachusetts legislature.  In what some may have consider the misguided opinion of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Norman v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 
                                                 
207 See Dralle, 529 N.E.2d 209, 214 (citing Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1987)). 
208 See id. 
209 See supra notes 102-4 and accompanying text. 
210 See supra notes 105-9 and accompanying text. 
 30 
parents were not allowed to seek recovery for the loss of filial consortium.211  Righting a 
perceived wrong perpetuated by the judiciary, the Massachusetts assembly enacted legislation 
creating a private cause of action for the parents of dependent children against third-party 
tortfeasors who injure their children.212  Rather than relying on the judiciary the create new 
rights for them, the people of Massachusetts instead sought a remedy with the legislature, clearly 
enunciating the bounds in which a parent may seek damages for the loss of a child’s consortium.  
Today, the Massachusetts parent-plaintiff, in spite of that state’s highest court, may sue a 
intentional or negligent third-party tortfeasor for the loss of a severely injured dependent child’s 
consortium.213 
E.   Legislative Fiat: The Solution  
The argument of this paper is that in light of the confusing body of judicial decision-
making which exists today, especially in states like Michigan, the legislature needs to step in and 
set forth clear rules by which consortium claims may be sought.  Some commentators argue that 
waiting for the legislature to act in this regard is useless due to the sometimes slow manner in 
which the legislature acts, and the competing interest groups which seek to influence the law 
through the legislative branch.214  However, at least in the case of consortium, leaving the 
creation of new causes of action and rights to judicial fiat, besides offending the restraint-based 
feelings of many, has resulted in utter confusion.  Geography is the determining factor as to 
whether a parent may seek recovery for the loss of a child’s consortium and whether a child may 
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seek the loss of a parent’s consortium.  As an illustration, if the case is lodged in a Michigan 
court, children may seek parental consortium damages but parents may not seek filial 
consortium damages.215  Such an interpretation makes as much sense as allowing one spouse to 
seek consortium damages while denying the other spouse the same right.   
The bottom line, from a policy standpoint, is that the nature of familial relationship in 
society continues to evolve.  Just as the spousal relationship has evolved from the archaic 
notions of a master-servant relationship, so to has the parent-child relationship.  Children are, as 
repeatedly stated by courts recognizing filial consortium actions, valued today for the society 
and companionship they provide their parents.  A logical solution, in both the legal and non-
legal sense, is the approach taken by the Massachusetts legislature.  Legislatures should, in light 
of the policies underlying consortium actions, clearly enunciate that parents and children, if not 
already recognized, should be allowed to seek consortium damages for the loss of one another.    
CONCLUSION  
 At the very least, this paper describes some of the varying philosophies and rationales 
that have allowed courts and legislatures to come to the conclusion that parents should or should 
not be allowed to seek damages for the loss of a child’s consortium.  The Michigan Supreme 
Court, it could be argued, wants do away consortium damages altogether in the parent-child 
relationship, but instead renders a decision which limits recovery in tort but makes little common 
sense.  Using much of the same analysis the Michigan Supreme Court uses but coming out with 
the completely opposite opinion in the matter are the Florida and Ohio Supreme Courts.  
Reaching back to earlier decisions of the same court, the Florida found that law as well as equity 
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mandated that parents be allowed to seek recovery for the loss of filial consortium.216  Likewise, 
the Ohio Supreme Court, in dicta gone mad, recognized the same right.217   Perhaps most 
confusing is the Illinois interpretation.  Trying to strike a balance between what it phrased 
“direct” and “indirect” actions, the court allowed parents to seek damages for filial consortium if 
their were not derivative of their child’s claims against the same party but denied recovery when 
the parent’s claim was derivative of the child’s suit.218  Interestingly, New York courts simply do 
not allow recover for any non-financial damages, such as consortium-type claims, in the parent 
child relationship.219  Finally, although the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that filial 
consortium damages are not allowed under Massachusetts law,220 the legislature took it upon 
itself to reverse the pronouncement.  Instead, Massachusetts parents are now allowed by statute 
to seek compensation for the loss of a severely injured dependent child’s consortium.221   
 So is there an approach which is preferred?  The answer is of course.  Certainly it is easy 
to have an opinion over which state “got it right.”   In this case, however, the Michigan Supreme 
Court does not hold the answer, neither do the Supreme Courts of Florida, Ohio, Illinois, New 
York and Massachusetts.  For that matter, no court, state or federal, should be involved in the 
contraction or expansion of consortium claims.  Rather, the matter should be left up to the 
legislature, with the severity of the injury as the linchpin.  If society, or the citizens of a 
particular state, are so bothered by the fact that they may not seek some type of damages they are 
allowed a remedy through their elected representatives.  The Massachusetts legislature got it 
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right.  It should be up to the people, through their elected bodies, to establish a clear standard for 
the consortium action.  
 34 
